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ABSTRACT

Sensor data is processed to assess performance and health of complex systems.
Proper sensor selection, placement, and implementation are critical to build an effective
health management system. For complex systems in which the timely assessment of the
health is desired to avoid expensive consequences of failure, sensor placement is vital.
The ability to identify a critical failure early is completely dependent on sensor location
within the fault propagation path. A strategy for assessing a sensor suite with respect to
timely critical failure detection is presented in this thesis. To illustrate the strategy, Fault
Propagation Timing Analysis (FPTA) will be performed on the Rocketdyne RS-68 rocket
engine.
The strategy consists of building directed graphs to represent the architecture and
flows of the system. These graphs identify potential fault propagation paths for any
selected failure mode located at a node. Fault propagation times are then generated for
each arc and node within the propagation path. Locations where the fault propagation
terminates are identified as critical effect nodes within the system. Candidate sensor
suites may then be inserted into the graph. Time to detect is then compared to the time to
criticality in order to assess sensor suite effectiveness.
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NOMENCLATURE

HMS

Health Management System

FPTA

Fault Propagation Timing Analysis

FOM

Figure Of Merit

NLP

Nonlinear Program

MINLP

Mixed Integer Nonlinear Program

MFD

Multiple Fault Diagnosis

QDG

Quantified Directed Graph

FMEA

Failure Modes and Effects Analysis

FTA

Fault Tree Analysis

EELV

Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle

CaLV

Cargo Launch Vehicle

FTP

Fuel Turbo Pump

MCC

Main Combustion Chamber

1. INTRODUCTION

Effective design of health management systems for complex systems represents
an important challenge in engineering. Health management deals with the timely
detection, diagnosis and correction of abnormal behavior caused by faults in a system.
Early detection and diagnosis of faults while the system is still operating in a controllable
environment may help avoid progression of faulty behavior to a critical point. The Space
Shuttle Columbia accident represents a strong case for the effective design of health
management systems. If the effects of the foam strike were detectable and diagnosable
before the shuttle attempted reentry the catastrophe might have been avoided.
The input data that Health Management Systems (HMS) require to make
assessments of the status of a system originates from sensors. Positions of sensors, along
with implementation define the range of potentially critical failures that a HMS may
isolate. Isolation of critical failures is required for a HMS to potentially compose a
corrective action. The corrective action may take the form of switching to a redundant
channel, activating a mitigation mechanism, or sending notification to an interested
source. In all cases, the corrective action must take place before a fault propagates to a
critical situation. Making a diagnosis of the system in a timely manner requires sensors
to be located at or near the point of fault origination. It is desired to have the ability to
analyze candidate sensor suites with respect to the ability to sense critical failure modes
in a timely manner.
Complex systems, such as aerospace systems, are developed through a series of
design reviews. Within each design cycle different design considerations are studied.
All components under consideration must demonstrate a clear added value to the system.
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The costs and risks associated with the complex system drive the design cycles to
eliminate any components that are not able to demonstrate their value to the design.
When considering sensors to contribute to an effective HMS system the challenge is to be
able to justify each measurement’s existence in terms of added value to the system.
There are a myriad of tradeoffs when considering an optimal sensor suite for any
given system. Parameters such as weight, cost, time constants, etc., have to be compared
against each other to assemble a candidate sensor suite with the goal of meeting the
requirements imposed upon the system. The sensor suite evaluation strategy described in
this thesis primarily addresses a time to detect requirement. The evaluation provides for
time to criticality to be assessed as well, allowing a comparison between the two times to
identify sensor suite effectiveness. There exists a race condition between HMS being
able to sense and react to a failure, and the time for off-nominal behavior caused by that
failure to propagate to a critical condition. A timeline that defines the events that lead up
to criticality is shown in Figure 1.1. The goal, in this thesis, is to select a sensor suite that
can minimize the time to detect.
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Figure 1.1. Time to Criticality Timeline

The Rocketdyne RS-68 rocket was selected to demonstrate the sensor suite
evaluation strategy. The RS-68 is the first new U.S. engine certified to fly since the
Space Shuttle Main Engine over 20 years ago. The RS-68 has also been selected to boost
the first stage of the Ares V Cargo Launch Vehicle that is part of the next generation of
launch vehicles in NASA’s exploration vision. Fault Propagation Timing Analysis
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(FPTA) is performed on the RS-68 to demonstrate how a hypothetical sensor suite
performs with respect to the time to detect.
Chapter 2 is a literature review of sensor selection strategies that have been
developed. Failure identification and analysis methods are also described. Deficiencies
of these concepts are identified and represent the opportunity for improvement that FPTA
offers in being able to evaluate a sensor suite and its ability to detect faults in a timely
manner. Chapter 3 describes the FPTA method and how it is implemented to evaluate a
sensor suite. FPTA is then implemented on Rocketdyne’s RS-68 rocket engine in chapter
4. Lastly, the conclusions and future work are presented in the final section.

5
2. LITERATURE REVIEW

Sensor selection strategies for complex systems are numerous and have a broad
range of approaches to meet each individual system’s needs. The intended purpose for
each of the sensor suites implemented in these systems dictates the aspects that need to be
addressed during the selection process. Maul, et al. (2007) describe the sensor selection
process in two parts: an evaluation module and an optimization module. These modules
will be used to demonstrate past sensor selection strategies.

2.1. SENSOR SELECTION EVALUATION
The effectiveness of a particular sensor suite is evaluated by identifying the
requirements that need to be addressed within a system, and the ability of the selected
sensors to meet those requirements. The degrees to which a sensor selection meets those
requirements can be defined as the Figures of Merit (FOMs) of the system. A set of
FOMs reflects the objectives of the sensor suite selection process. Sensor selection
strategies described in this section will be presented with regard to how they address the
following figures of merit identified by Maul, et al. (2007).
•

Observability: This category considers how well the sensor suite will provide
information about the given system process, which parameters that are directly
observed, and which parameters can be inferred.

•

Sensor Reliability/Sensor Fault Robustness: This category addresses sensor
reliabilities and how sensor availability impacts the overall sensor suite
performance.
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•

Fault Detectability / Fault Discriminability: This category specifically addresses
whether the sensor suite can detect and discriminate system failures.

•

Cost: This category can include development, purchase, and maintenance costs
for the sensors as well as resource and communication costs.

2.2. OPTIMIZATION PROCESS
Sensor selection problems addressing the before mentioned FOMs require fast
approximate search solutions to produce results in a timely manner. There are several
methods that have been developed which refine searches through identification of
possible candidates to find the optimal solution. The following is an introduction to some
of these general optimization strategies.
•

Debouk, et al. (1999), apply constraints on an objective function to streamline the
optimization process.

•

Worden (2001) applies advanced artificial analysis techniques such as genetic
algorithms and simulated annealing algorithms.

•

Eberhart (1995) proposed particle swarm optimization that is a population based
stochastic technique.

•

Osorio (2004) describes a cutting and surrogate constraint analysis that uses
constraint pairing and an initial integer solution to combine the dual surrogate
constraint with the objective function to generate new constraints.
This list is a representation of the variety of algorithms available to produce an

optimized solution. Optimizations techniques are not reviewed in detail here, but the
methods have been well documented by Fletcher (1987). A set of sensor selection
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optimization techniques and the associated references are listed in Table 2.1 that was
generated by Maul, et al. (2007).

Table 2.1. Sensor Selection Optimization Techniques and References
Optimization technique

Researcher

Constrain-Based Search

Narasimhan, et al. (1998), Mushini (2005)

Exhaustive/Brute Force Search

Debouk, et al. (1999), Mushini (2005),
Narasimhan, et al. (1998), Madron (1992),
Worden (2001)

Genetic Algorithms

Musulin, et al. (2005), Mushini (2005),
Spanache, et al. (2004), Sen, et al. (1998),
Santi, et al. (2005), Worden (2001)

Particle Swarm Optimization

Zhang (2005)

Graph Theory: Spanning Trees and Cutsets

Ali (1993 and 1995), Bagajewicz (1997
and 1999)

Cutting and Surrogate Constraint Analysis

Azam, et al. (2004)

Mixed Linear Integer Programming

Bagajewicz (2000, 2002, and 2004),
Chemielewski, et al. (2002)

Simulated Annealing Algorithm

Worden (2001)
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2.3. REVIEW OF SENSOR SELECTION PROCESSES
The first three Figures of Merit (FOMs) that Maul, et al. (2007) describe are used
to guide the review of sensor selection processes that have been developed. The fourth
FOM, cost, is a straightforward penalty driven group and may be included in the concepts
that address each of the three FOMs discussed. The FOMs that are covered are
observability, sensor reliability/sensor fault robustness and fault detectability/fault
discrimination.
2.3.1.Observability. A system’s ability to provide information about its state
with respect to performance monitoring, health assessment, and control of the system is
of paramount importance. Some strategies define the degree of observability by
analyzing a state space model that represents the process of interest. Van den Berg, et al.
(2000) define the criteria for degrees of observability by determining the amount of
signal received by a sensor for a system configuration of a tubular chemical reactor.
Optimal sensor locations for the reactor are found by specifying scalar measures on the
observability Gramian integral from the linear least-squares state estimation problem.
Muller (1972), similarly, develops scalar metrics from the observability matrix to define
the degree of observability for linear dynamical systems. Dochain, et al. (1997) identify
a criterion that is the condition number of the observability matrix of the linearized
tangent model of the discretized model of fixed bed bioreactors.
Other approaches to display degrees of observability use graph-based approaches
that capture the architectural information of a given system. Two graph-oriented
algorithms for observability and redundancy classification were proposed by Kretsovalis
(1987). Luong, et al. (1994) establish an incidence matrix using graph-based analysis.
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The incidence matrix related process relationships to the state variables qualitatively.
Identification of unmeasured variables and determination of whether a measured variable
was redundant is accomplished by the decomposition of the incidence matrix.
Bagajewitcz (1999) describes the degree of estimability that incorporates degrees of
observability and redundancy to assess system variables that may be estimated by
measurements. A variable that is not measured is observable if it can be identified in at
least one way from the measurements. Similarly, a measurement is redundant if it can be
found in at least one way from the remaining measurements.
There is a large body of work that focuses on identifying observability in
structural type problems. Papadopoulos (1998) proposes a scheme that selects the most
linearly independent impulse responses at all candidate sensor locations from a GramSchmidt orthogonalization procedure. Also proposed is a scheme based on a principal
component analysis and iteratively removes sensors that do not contribute significant
information to the Fisher information matrix. Hac (1993) uses quantitative measures of
observability based on gramians to determine sensor locations in motion control of
flexible structures. By determining eigenvalues, obtained in closed form from
corresponding gramians in each optimization step, an optimality criterion is established.
Some strategies for assessing system observability include utilizing prediction of
error of a given sensor suite with respect to various parameters of interest. Chmielewski,
et al. (2002) propose a Nonlinear Program (NLP) that is independent of all decision
variables. The NLP can then be converted into a convex program through the use of
linear matrix inequalities. Using the results, sensor placement is established by standard
interior-point and branch-and-bound search algorithms. Musulin, et al. (2005) identify
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sensor suite observability by maximizing Kalman filtering performance. The
measurement noise and observation matrices are manipulated to produce the parameters.
Similarly, Mushini (2005), proposed maximizing a Kalman filter performance by
utilizing a metric defined as a function of the steady state error-covariance and the cost of
the selected sensors. The optimal measurement sets for an aircraft gas turbine engine are
then estimated. Madron (1992) uses multiple Gauss-Jordan elimination of the system of
linear mathematical model equations to generate classifications of observability for
sensor suites.
2.3.2.Sensor Reliability/Sensor Fault Robustness. Observability and
detectability become useless if measurements are not available to make the detections.
Being able to identify how reliably a system can make detections for fault diagnosis is of
considerable importance. Therefore it is important to be acquainted with strategies for
assessing the reliability and fault robustness of sensors.
Considerable consideration has been made for assessing the performance of a
sensor network in the presence of sensor faults. Bagajewicz (1997) defines qualifying
constraints that relate to certain requirements of data reconciliation with the goal of
minimizing cost. Error detectability is defined as the ability of the sensor network to
detect sensor faults. Availability is defined as the precision after a failed sensor is
removed. Resilience is defined as precision in the presence of a sensor fault. These
constraints define the ability of a sensor network to perform in the presence of a sensor
fault. Bagajewicz (2002) then extends this research to include explicit Mixed Integer
Nonlinear Program (MINLP) formulation. Hardware redundancy is then taken into
account as an extension of the theory represented in this work.
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Some researchers define the reliability of an instrumentation system as the
probability that information required for control are available through measurements or
deduction during a given time period. Using this definition, Loung, et al. (1994) compute
the number of sensor failures conserving the observability of the variables required for
control. This is done by classification of various parameters needed for control.
Competing networks are compared by integration of the time profile for each sensor
network.
Yet other researchers identify the concept of sensor reliability as the reliability of
the availability of measurements to provide system state estimations. Ali (1993) focuses
on identifying how robustly a sensor network can handle failures and still estimate a
variable. Using a graph-theoretic algorithm, globally optimum solutions are generated
for realistic processes. Later, Ali (1995) adds to the algorithm to identify the optimal
design for a redundant sensor network for linear processes. This algorithm accounts for
specifications of measurable variables. Sen, et al. (1998) use genetic algorithms to allow
for multiple performance metrics to be evaluated along with the optimization of objective
functions with a single criterion. Similarly, Bagajewicz (2000), used MINLP to provide
for multiple metrics, such as cost to be optimized along with reliability.
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2.3.3.Fault Detectability/Fault Discriminability. While observabiliy provides
information about state parameters required for making a system health diagnosis, fault
detection and discriminability define the sensor network’s ability to distinguish off
nominal from nominal operation and the ability to distinguish these faults from each
other, respectively. Observability, detectability and discriminability are all necessary to
be able to process sensor data and to make a system health diagnosis.
Some research focuses on using system behavioral models and reliability data to
assess sensor placement. Azam, et al. (2004) propose using such a model along with
fault probabilities and effects of faults on observable system parameters to evaluate a
sensor suite. Fault effect information is translated into cause-effect dependencies and
detection probabilities are then computed. Multiple Fault Diagnosis (MFD) algorithms
search for the most likely candidate fault subset that best explains the set of observed
discrepancies from the bipartite graph model. Optimal sensor allocation is then
performed after a set of performance measures are calculated using the candidate fault
subset. The optimization was performed using surrogate cutting and constraint pairingbased method.
Santi, et al. (2005) propose a detection strategy for rocket propulsion systems in
which thresholds are used to determine off–nominal behavior. Measurements from
multiple sensor sources must exceed a prescribed threshold limit for reliable fault
detection. A minimum measurement deviation level for that fault detection within a
defined false alarm limit is designated as the detection threshold limit. Figure 2.1 shows
the detectable fault zone that is the measurement space area where the outputs from two
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sensors exceed a detection threshold limit. A fault becomes detectable when its
measurement level reaches the trajectory location that intersects the detection threshold.

Figure 2.1. Fault Trajectory Space for Two Sensors Described by Santi, et al. (2005)

There is much research that focuses on assessing detectability by qualitatively
analyzing the fault propagation process. Several researchers including Raghuraj, et al
(1999), Bushan (2000), and Bagajewicz, et al. (2004) use directed graphs, or digraphs, to
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represent faults in a system. Faults are related to sensors through dependencies modeled
by the digraphs. This graph provides an indication of which sensors should respond to
which faults. Spanache, et al. (2004) capture the behavior of a system through a series of
constraints that represent the limitations imposed on the evolution of the variables. The
constraints and fault signatures that are assigned to failed components are then used to
establish a component oriented fault signature matrix. Similarly, Narasimhan, et al.
(1998) identify qualitative fault signatures by establishing temporal causal graphs derived
from a bond graph model. The temporal causal graph is a directed graph, where vertices
are the system variables and the edges represent the causal relationship between these
variables qualified by the temporal characteristics of the relation.
Yan (2004) uses the CAD environment to implement a diagnosability analysis for
sensor placement. In this work the fault signature matrix is found by projections of
different operation modes on observable variables. While these qualitative methods
represent a straightforward strategy for relating system faults to effects, there are several
researchers that chose to incorporate more fault information in hopes of augmenting these
useful techniques. Zhang (2005) proposes a Quantified Directed Graph (QDG) in hopes
of capturing quantitative information to model the behavior of a system. In a QDG, each
node represents a sensor location with a signal to noise ratio. A sensor detectability
measure was then calculated for each sensor and then evaluated against an assigned lower
bound. The qualitative methods presented here are ideal for identification of fault
signatures to analyze sensor placement during the early design stages of complex
systems. These methods are also preferable because they are less expensive than
hardware and software simulation techniques.
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2.4. FAILURE ANALYSIS METHODS
Failure Analysis is an integral part of identifying a sensor suite’s ability to detect
fault in a system. Being able to identify the ways in which a failure mode manifests itself
as a fault within a system yields information about what measurements need to be taken
to isolate the failure. There are a couple of failure analysis techniques that are regarded
as the standard in failure assessment in the aerospace industry. Tumer (2003) points out
that Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) is the standard failure analysis method
used in design. FMEA is a risk assessment technique for systematically identifying
potential failures in a system or process. System experts identify failure modes for each
component within a system. Effects are also recorded for each of these failure modes.
One of the shortfalls of the FMEA approach is that there is little attempt at assessing
failure propagation times for each of the failure modes. When fault propagation time
numbers are identified they are usually too coarse to make design decisions with. FMEA
may indicate time to criticality as instant, seconds, minutes, hours, or even longer periods
of time. This provides an idea of how fast a fault propagates to a critical condition, but
does not give any exact numbers.
Another failure analysis approach commonly implemented for complex systems
during the design stages is Fault Tree Analysis (FTA). Bahr (1997) indicates that fault
trees are widely used not only in reliability analysis, but also in safety analysis because of
their ability to account for failure beyond single part malfunctions. FTA is a failure
analysis in which a critical state of a system is indicated as the top node in the tree.
Using Boolean logic the top node event trees out to lower level events that are causes of

16
the higher level events. While FTA represents an invaluable tool for evaluating the
events that lead up to a failure, they fall short in that they do not address how fast these
events ultimately manifest themselves as the undesired situation.
On the other end of the spectrum of strategies for identifying propagation times is
physics based simulation. These simulations yield precise numbers that may be used to
accurately assess a system’s ability to handle candidate failure scenarios. Simulations
that have the fidelity to produce these numbers are usually very expensive and time
consuming to produce. Another shortfall in the implementation of these simulations is
that there has to be a great deal of design information available for production of a model
that can yield the type of timing information that is desired to evaluate a sensor suite’s
ability to detect a fault.

2.5. PROPOSED APPROACH
All of the failure analysis techniques mentioned are not necessarily implemented
during the early stages of design. A sufficient level of design maturity is needed to be
able to generate both FMEA, FTA and physics based simulation. FMEA usually requires
more information about the components to be able to accurately identify the ways in
which specific components may fail. Physics based simulation needs more information
to be able to generate equations to accurately represent the system.
The proposed approach, Fault Propagation Timing Analysis (FPTA), may be
implemented during the early design stages of a system to make evaluations of sensor
suites. During conceptual development when there is an idea of the type of components
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that a system might have, these configurations may be represented in directed graphs and
an FPTA analysis can be completed to evaluate sensor placement.
FPTA is an augmentation of some of the directed graph approaches mentioned in
section 2.1.1.3. of this thesis and contributes directly to the detectability evaluation of a
sensor suite. Previous digraph approaches did a good job of relating faults to sensors
through modeled dependencies, but failed in providing a sense for how much time it took
for that fault to reach a sensor. This research outlines an approach for assigning
propagation times to the dependencies of the digraph in order to evaluate how long it
takes for a fault to become detectable by a sensor. A natural addition to this concept is
that a propagation time can be identified for a fault to reach a critical condition.
Comparison of the time to criticality and the time to detect allows for a quantitative
evaluation of a candidate sensor suite’s ability to detect a failure mode.
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3. RESEARCH METHOD

To support sensor suite assessment with respect to a system’s ability to identify
off-nominal behavior before a critical state is reached I propose Fault Propagation Timing
Analysis (FPTA). The analysis is presented as a series of steps to follow for sensor suite
evaluation implementation on a system.

3.1. STEP 1: BUILD DIRECTED GRAPH
To complete an FPTA, a directed graph must be built for the system to be
instrumented. Inputs that are needed to build the graph include, but are not limited to,
system schematics, drawings, illustrations, concept of operations, and expert solicitation.
The nodes of the graph represent the components of the system that have the potential for
failure. The arcs represent fault propagation paths of the system. Components are
arranged and connected to model the interactions that represent the functional
dependencies of the system. For instance, an electric motor generates mechanical energy
to be transferred through a gearbox to a wheel. The directed graph for this system is
illustrated in Figure 3.1.

Figure 3.1. Directed Graph Example
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Fault propagation paths can be a superset of two types of flows within a system.
There are nominal system flows and flows that may occur as a result of off-nominal
behavior. The nominal system flows are usually easy to identify. These nominal flows
might be the energy, signal, or mass flows that are functionally intended to flow between
components to provide for overall system functionality. The nominal flows usually
represent the majority of paths that a fault may propagate within a system. For example,
if an electrical wire breaks, electricity will fail to transfer to the appropriate components
within the system. The effects of the failed wire would propagate through the system
following nominal paths, that is, there will be a lack of power to downstream
components. The off-nominal system flows that occur as a result of a failure are usually
more difficult to identify. These flows must be represented by arcs to directly address the
effect of that failure. For example, if a battery overheats and explodes, an off-nominal
system flow might be modeled as an arc from the battery to any components that may be
affected by the explosion. If the system was working the way it was intended to perform,
there would be no arcs from the battery to these components. The objective is to capture
all potential fault propagation paths that may occur within a system.

3.2. STEP 2: IDENTIFY POTENTIAL FAILURE MODES
FPTA analysis relies on understanding the ways a system may fail. The extent to
which failure modes are identified within a system is dependent on the desired capability
of the candidate sensor suites. When completing FPTA analysis on complex systems that
have potentially expensive consequences of failure, it is desired to comprehensively
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identify failure modes with the goal of assessing sensor suite detection capabilities for
any given failure scenario. Failure modes are identified for each of the components that
are modeled. Any off-nominal condition that the component has the possibility of
encountering may be considered a failure mode. The condition is identified as a failure
mode when the failure effects cause off-nominal behavior to be seen at components that
are located downstream from the failed component in the digraph.
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) is an excellent source of this type of
failure information that is generally available for complex systems. FMEA is a risk
assessment technique for systematically identifying potential failures in a system or
process. Failure modes are identified for each component within a system. Effects are
also recorded for each of these failure modes. These effects aid in the identification of
fault propagation paths.
While FMEA offers a valuable bottom-up approach to potential system failure
identification, Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) is a top-down method. FTA identifies a critical
event that is defined as the “top event” and then trees out to reveal potential causes of that
event. Paths of the tree pass through Boolean logic gates that define which lower level
events may lead to the “top event”. The lower levels of the fault tree that identify
potential failure sources that lead to the critical event are then related to component
failures that may be represented in the FPTA digraph.
Once failure modes are identified, using whichever approach deemed appropriate,
fault propagation paths may be developed. The failure modes represent the initiation of a
given fault propagation path. The faults that result from these failure modes also define
which dependencies represented in the digraph are valid propagations. The determination
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of these paths is made from understanding the effects of each of the failure modes and is
discussed in section 2.4 of this thesis.

3.3. STEP 3: INSERT SENSORS
After a directed graph is completed that models all of the components and
dependency paths of a system, candidate sensor suites may be inserted. A sensor is seen
as another component in a directed graph of a system. The arcs, or fault propagation
paths, that are inputs to the sensors follow the same conventions as described earlier.
Any signal, energy, or mass flow that a given sensor is intended to measure is drawn as
an arc from a component in the system to that sensor. The component that the arc is
drawn from may be the component where that sensor is physically located, or it may be a
component that the sensor is intended to directly measure. Sensors will sometimes not
have outputs because faults caused by failure modes in the system will usually propagate
along nominal flow paths. Sensor nodes may have output ports if there are failure modes
that need to be taken into account for the system due to the existence of the sensor. For
instance, a pressure sensor located on a combustion chamber represents a potential gas
leakage point if failure occurs. A significant consideration has to made for the sensor
failing to make a detection as well. This failure may manifest itself in several ways such
as a detection failing off-scale or sensor drift. These types of failures can be common
and should therefore be accounted for.
While sensors have the possibility of failing, the ability of a system to overcome a
sensor failure in order to make a failure determination is out of the scope of this work.
There have been several strategies developed for allocating sensors and for processing
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data from those sensors to accurately diagnose a system’s health in the presence of sensor
faults. The goal of this work is to be able to assess how well a given sensor suite can
detect a critical fault in a timely manner. The strategy described in this thesis takes into
account the time for a fault to propagate to a sensor, and the time it takes for any given
sensor to realize that the fault has occurred. The time for a sensor to identify the fault in
the system incorporates all sensor latencies associated with time constants, red lines, etc.
It is not intended to be able to assess the time it takes to process the data to make a health
status determination.

3.4. STEP 4: IDENTIFY CRITICAL FAILURE POINTS
It is desired to assess sensor placement to identify failures before the fault leads to
an expensive consequence. If time to criticality is known, it may be compared to the time
to detect to make a determination of sensor suite effectiveness. FPTA analysis allows for
a time to criticality assessment. It is necessary to understand the way the system can fail
and what the effects of these failures will be to identify points of criticality. Points of
criticality represent locations within a system that off-nominal behavior will manifest
itself as an expensive consequence. For instance, when a valve fails to open, the
immediate effects associated with that valve failing may not be critical. But when a
combustion chamber downstream of that valve fails to receive fuel, this represents a point
of criticality. The scenario becomes critical when the combustion chamber behavior
becomes off nominal because those consequences are more significant than upstream
effects of the failure.
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The points of criticality may be modeled as nodes in the directed graph. The
input is any flow that may demonstrate the symptoms of off-nominal behavior from a
component. There will usually be no outputs of the points of criticality because these
nodes represent where a propagation path will terminate. There are scenarios though
where there may be two critical failures that can lead to a more crucial consequence. In
such a case one could model fault propagation paths from each of the critical failures to
another point of criticality that represents the more crucial consequence.

3.5. STEP 5: IDENTIFY FAULT PROPAGATION PATHS
To identify which sensors have the opportunity of detecting off-nominal behavior
of a system due to a failure, it is necessary to know the path in which a given fault may
propagate. Propagation paths are generated by tracking dependency paths that are
modeled in the directed graph of a system. Any failure that occurs in a component, or
node, of the graph will propagate along the arcs that point to downstream components
that are affected by the propagation of the fault. For any fault of interest, a path may be
traced from the component along the arcs and nodes until a critical point is reached.

3.6. STEP 6: IMPLEMENT TIMING ANALYSIS
The timing analysis identifies the time it takes from initiation of the failure mode
to the manifestation of the critical fault. The analysis also identifies the time it takes for
the off-nominal flows of the system to be detected by a given sensor suite. The failure
propagation path is populated with times that represent how fast the fault propagates
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through the system. Times are identified for each arc and node in the graph. Times that
are identified for the arcs represent the time it takes for a fault to propagate from the
output of one component to the input of the next component. Times that are identified
for a module represent the time it takes for a fault to propagate from the input of a
component to the output of that component.
Depending on the goals of the timing analysis, there are several strategies for
producing these propagation times. During the early design process the numbers may be
generated by expert solicitation. The digraph represents an early conceptual formulation
of a system and a subject matter expert may be asked how long it would take a fault to
propagate from one point to another. The times would be inserted into the digraph and
the timing analysis would identify potential issues that may be resolved during
subsequent design cycles.
In order to accurately assess a sensor suite with respect to its ability to detect
faults in a timely manner it is desired to use a high fidelity approach to producing the
propagation times for insertion to the digraph. Such an approach would include physics
based simulation of a system. A fault condition may be simulated and the propagation
time can be identified by analyzing the simulation parameters that are located
downstream of the component that failed. Accurate propagation times may also be
produced from calculations that take system characteristics into account. For instance, a
propagation time can be identified for a system where liquids flow through conduit by
dividing the speed at which the liquid is moving by the length of conduit.
There is a notion of characteristic propagation times as well. If the underlying
physical mechanisms by which the faults propagate are known there may be a
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characteristic time of propagation that accurately captures the way the system behaves.
For example, electrical faults typically propagate at speeds determined by the
transportation of electrons through wire. Some characteristic times for various functional
flows are shown in table 3.1.

Table 3.1. Characteristic Propagation Times
Functional Flow

Characteristic Time

Electrical Energy

1-10 milliseconds

Data computation

10-100 milliseconds

Fluid flow

5-30 milliseconds

Radiative Heat Transfer

Minutes to hours

Gas flow

10 milliseconds – seconds

Regardless of what fidelity is needed for the propagation times that are inserted
into the graph, an evaluation of a sensor suite may be performed to identify its ability to
identify faults before they become critical. Times identified for each of the arcs and
nodes are summed as the propagation path is followed. Conclusions may then be drawn
as to which sensors have the ability to detect a fault before it leads to a critical event.
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4. RS-68

The Rocketdyne RS-68 rocket engine is presented here to demonstrate Fault
Propagation Timing Analysis (FPTA). According to Wood [2002] the RS-68 is the first
new U.S. engine certified to fly since the Space Shuttle Main Engine over 20 years ago.
The RS-68 powers the Delta IV Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV). It is
planned to use 5 RS-68 engines to power the Ares V Cargo Launch Vehicle (CaLV) of
NASA’s Project Constellation. The RS-68 is a complex system with expensive
consequences of failure. FPTA is performed to assess candidate sensor suites with
respect to timely critical failure detection within the RS-68. The analysis follows the
steps outlined in the previous chapter.

4.1. INTRODUCTION TO THE RS-68
The RS-68 burns liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen in a gas generator cycle. The
engine has the capability of transitioning between full power and a minimum power level
as commanded from the vehicle. The engine supplies gasses to pressurize the fuel and
oxidizer propellant tanks. The RS-68 also provides for thrust vector and roll control by
gimballing the thrust chamber and the fuel turbine exhaust roll control nozzle. Turbopumps are directly powered through a single shaft by turbines. A gas generator powers
the turbines in parallel with high-pressure hot gas combusted from propellants tapped off
after the pumps. The engine has an ablative nozzle with a lining that is designed to burn
away as the engine runs, dissipating heat. The RS-68 engine operating characteristics
and schematic are shown in Figure 4.1 and 4.2, respectively.
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Figure 4.1. RS-68 Operating Characteristics

Figure 4.2. RS-68 Operating Schematic
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4.2. STEP 1: BUILD RS-68 DIGRAPH
FPTA analysis is initiated on the RS-68 by building a directed graph, or digraph,
to represent the architecture of the rocket engine. Components that represent failure
sources for the engine are the nodes of the graph. Nominal flow paths between the
components are modeled as the arcs of the digraph. These flows represent the functional
dependencies between the components of the engine. The arcs are distinguished into
three categories of flow types. Flows representing energy dependencies between
components such as electrical and mechanical energy flows are represented by thin solid
arrows. Thick solid arrows represent mass flows such as solid, gas, or liquid flows. Thin
dashed arrows represent data flows that signify control signals or sensor data. A digraph
that models the architecture of the RS-68 is shown in Figure 4.3.
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Figure 4.3. RS-68 Digraph

4.3. STEP 2: IDENTIFY FAILURE MODES OF RS-68
To analyze fault propagation times of the RS-68, it is essential to identify the
ways in which the system may fail. Failure modes are identified for each of the
components that are modeled. A list of failure modes and effects associated with some of
the components identified in the RS-68 digraph are presented in Table 1 of the Appendix.
Immediate, downstream, and end effect are identified for each of the failure modes in this
example FMEA. The failure mode and effect information is used to guide the FPTA
process as the propagation paths and effect nodes are analyzed.
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4.4. STEP 3: INSERT CANDIDATE SENSOR SUITE
Candidate sensor suites may now be inserted into the digraph. An example sensor
suite implemented on a rocket engine in order to initiate a shutdown in response to a
critical failure is shown in table 4.1. A snapshot of the RS-68 digraph with the fuel pump
discharge pressure and Fuel Turbo-Pump (FTP) shaft speed sensor inserted is displayed
in Figure 4.4. The arcs that connect a component to the sensor represent the flow that is
measured. For instance, the FTP shaft speed sensor measures the mechanical energy of
the turbine shaft. Therefore a link that represents that mechanical energy is drawn from
the turbo-pump to the sensor.

Table 4.1. Example Candidate Red-line Sensor List for the RS-68
Sensor

Location

Fuel Pump Discharge Pressure

FTP discharge duct just after the pump

Fuel Turbine Temperature

Hot gas inlet duct to the fuel turbine

Main Combustion Chamber Pressure

At the top of the combustion chamber

Fuel turbo-pump shaft speed

FTP

Oxidizer turbo-pump shaft speed

OTP
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Figure 4.4. RS-68 Digraph Snapshot With Sensors

4.5. STEP 4: IDENTIFY CRITICAL FAILURE POINTS OF THE RS-68
To identify fault propagation paths it is desired to identify the critical failure
points that represent the costly consequences of a failure within a system. The example
RS-68 FMEA located in Appendix A is a source of information that may facilitate the
identification of the critical points in the digraph. For example, when the gas generator
fuel valve exhibits the failure mode of being stuck closed, there is no fuel flow to the gas
generator combustion chamber. This condition potentially leads to an explosion at the
chamber due to oxygen rich conditions because the oxidizer valve allows oxidizer to flow
without the fuel needed for complete combustion. This represents a critical consequence
and may be indicated by another node in the digraph as shown in Figure 4.5.
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Figure 4.5. RS-68 Digraph Snapshot With Critical Point

4.6. STEP 5: IDENTIFY FAULT PROPAGATION PATHS
The RS-68 digraph now has the essential elements that are needed to identify fault
propagation paths that may then be used to initialize the timing analysis. A component
along with a failure mode is chosen to implement the timing analysis. A failure of
interest might be the pump head loss of the oxidizer turbo-pump. The effect of this
failure eventually leads to a low thrust condition of the engine. The propagation path
begins with the fuel turbo-pump and follows the flow dependencies modeled in the
system to the critical failure point of low thrust that would be seen as an output of the
nozzle. The propagation path may be seen in Figure 4.6. The propagation path indicates
that there are potentially three sensors that can pick up the fault at different points in the
system.
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Figure 4.6. RS-68 FTP Head Efficiency Loss Propagation Path

4.7. STEP 6: IMPLEMENT RS-68 TIMING ANALYSIS
To implement FPTA timing analysis the graph must be populated with fault
propagation times for each arc and node. These propagation times will allow for
determination of the time it takes for a fault to reach each component, sensor, and effect
node in the graph. The fault propagation path for the RS-68 fuel turbo-pump head loss
efficiency failure with propagation times identified is shown in Figure 4.7. A
propagation time of 28 ms is indicated for the hydrogen flow from the fuel turbo-pump to
the main fuel valve. The 28 ms represents the time from when the head loss first occurs
to when the off-nominal pressure could be seen at the main fuel valve.
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Figure 4.7. RS-68 Propagation Path With Times Included

4.8. RS-68 FPTA CONCLUSIONS
There are several conclusions that may be drawn from the FPTA analysis of the
RS-68 fuel turbo-pump head loss. First, there are several sensors in the propagation path
that should have the ability of detecting the fault before it becomes critical. The offnominal pressure may be sensed by the FTP fuel discharge pressure sensor within 4 ms of
failure. The fault is sensed by the MCC pressure sensor 83 ms after the failure. This is
not the end of the story for the sensors though. There are time constants that must be
taken into account. In most cases the off-nominal flow will have to exceed a red-line
before a fault will be recognized. This represents another latency that must be accounted
for to complete an accurate assessment of detectability. These times may then be
included in the digraph and the resulting sensor suite assessment will provide a time to
detect measure. The FPTA analysis indicates that it takes 2.083 seconds for there to be a
critical loss of thrust due to the FTP failure. The FPTA analysis allows for the time to
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detect to be compared to the time to criticality for several sensor suites, therefore
providing system designers with a strategy for assessing sensor suites with respect to
their ability to detect faults in a timely manner.
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5. CONCLUSIONS

In this thesis, a strategy for evaluating a sensor suite’s effectiveness in detecting
faults before they become critical has been presented. Fault Propagation Timing
Analysis (FPTA), is a flexible approach to evaluating sensor placement for a system
during various stages of design. Complex systems that have expensive consequences of
failure, such as those in the aerospace industry, benefit from the concepts that are
presented. FPTA was performed on Rocketdyne’s RS-68 rocket engine to illustrate how
the strategy may be implemented to compare the time to detect to the time to criticality.
The work presented in this thesis describes FPTA as an augmentation to several
detectability evaluation strategies that may be implemented through the use of directed
graphs. While previous approaches using digraphs were able to relate faults to sensors,
FPTA goes further by attaching fault propagation times to the dependencies modeled in
the graph. The propagation times may then be analyzed to identify time to detect and
time to criticality. These metrics allow for an evaluation of a sensor suite’s ability to
detect a fault before it becomes critical.
FPTA is being utilized to assess the detection capabilities of NASA’s Ares I
launch vehicle. The analysis has successfully produced results that are being accounted
for in the vehicle’s design cycles. Details of outputs derived from the analysis are
proprietary and are therefore not available in this work.
There are several challenges that exist in the further development of FPTA.
While the analysis described in this thesis can identify the time it takes for off-nominal
behavior of a system due to a failure to be sensed by a given sensor suite, there is no
assessment of a time to process and provide a response to the failure. An extension to the

37
fault propagation timing work would be development of a strategy for identifying the
time from failure detection to corrective action initiation as well as the time it takes for
the corrective action to take place. The identification of these propagation times would
allow a designer to make a comprehensive assessment of a system’s ability to respond to
any failure with the goal of avoiding critical consequences.
The successful implementation of FPTA is dependent on the failure data that is
available for a system. An area of work that can support the development of useful
FPTAs would be the development of a systematic approach to identifying cross
subsystem failure modes. While modeling dependency paths in a digraph that represent
nominal system behavior is usually straightforward, the identification of dependencies
representing off-nominal failure propagation is a challenging proposition. Cross
subsystem failures are very commonly not accounted for because of the nature of current
design practices. If there were a strategy to account for these potential failures, an FPTA
may be augmented to catch a comprehensive set of off-nominal conditions.
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APPENDIX
Table 1: RS-68 Example FMEA
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